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Response*
Tonderai W. Chikuhwa
If buttercups buzz’d after the bee,
If boats were on land, churches on sea,
If ponies rode men and if grass ate the cows,
And cats should be chased into holes by the mouse,
If the mamas sold their babies
To the gypsies for half a crown;
If summer were spring and the other way round,
Then all the world would be upside down.
     —English Ballad
I. Introduction
In the past two decades we have witnessed fundamental, unprece-
dented, and deeply disturbing shifts in the trends and nature of armed 
conflict. These changes have been characterized in particular by the tar-
geting of civilian populations as a deliberate tactic of warfare. Whereas 
civilians made up fewer than 5 percent of all casualties during World 
War I, today 75 percent or more of those killed or wounded in wars are 
noncombatants. The post-Cold War era has been marked by the prolif-
eration of conflicts within states, conflicts in which age-old norms and 
taboos are being broken. The most vulnerable—children, the elderly, 
and women—have become the primary targets of state and non-state 
parties to conflict. Not only are children most often in the direct line of 
fire, more horrific still is that in many instances around the world, they 
have also become the instruments of war, forced to give expression to 
the hatreds of adults and to commit the very worst brutalities against 
other children, their own families, and their communities. It is indeed a 
world turned upside down.
Against this backdrop and in response, the international commu-
nity in the past decade has made a concerted effort to elaborate a more 
coherent protection and assistance framework for civilians in armed 
conflict. This includes the establishment of several distinct agendas 
for categories of persons considered especially vulnerable, such as a 
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the United Nations.
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specific regime for the protection of children in wars, as well as a more 
concerted focus on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).
For over a decade, Francis Deng has been a moral voice of conscience 
on behalf of the internally displaced, pioneering the development of a 
normative protection framework and advocacy agenda for IDPs. His 
Roundtable essay, “Divided Nations: The Paradox of National Respon-
sibility,” outlines the United Nations agenda for assistance and pro-
tection to IDPs, and in particular the advances in this area under the 
mandate of the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral for Internally Displaced Persons, an office occupied by Deng from 
1992–2004. Deng’s essay traces the evolution of the agenda from the 
earliest conversations leading to the establishment of the mandate and 
role of the Representative of the Secretary-General, to the development 
of a normative protection and assistance framework for IDPs and the 
promotion and dissemination of the subsequent standards.
My essay examines and responds to Deng’s work. It identifies the 
strengths and successes of the mandate of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General for IDPs, namely, the development of a more coher-
ent normative framework for IDPs, the forging of a stronger political 
consensus on the internally displaced as well as a broadening of the 
circle of stakeholders, and deeper analytical treatment of the IDP prob-
lematique. It examines Deng’s conceptual point of departure expressed 
in the notion of “Sovereignty as Responsibility,” an idea that has 
emerged as the United Nations doctrine known as the “Responsibility 
to Protect.” Sovereignty as responsibility has represented the leitmotif 
of Deng’s advocacy as Representative of the Secretary-General.
However, in critique, this analysis argues that while it has improved 
the assistance response, the IDP agenda as defined under Deng’s man-
date has not gone far enough to deliver tangible protection for the 
internally displaced, particularly against direct acts of violence and 
other overt human rights violations. In spite of the significant contri-
butions made by Deng and the efforts of the international community, 
the reality on the ground in terms of the numbers and the abuses being 
committed against IDPs is catastrophic. Furthermore, the situation has 
deteriorated progressively in the past decade. The essay argues that to 
redress this imbalance between strong protection standards, on the one 
hand, and the actual circumstances and plight of the most vulnerable 
populations in situations of conflict, on the other hand, we must enter 
what the United Nations Secretary-General has referred to as an “era 
of application” of international standards. Essentially, the international 
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community must begin to redirect its energies from the elaboration of 
standards to ensuring their application on the ground.
This article argues for the need to balance the “carrot,” as exempli-
fied by Deng’s central emphasis on diplomacy, dialogue, collaboration, 
and assistance to national authorities to meet their protection respon-
sibilities, with the “stick,” which entails the adoption, where necessary 
and appropriate, of concrete and targeted measures to ensure that 
governments (and indeed non-state parties) do not shirk their sover-
eign responsibility to protect those under their jurisdiction. In arguing 
for and exploring this balance of carrot and stick, the essay outlines 
schematically the advances of the past decade on a contiguous United 
Nations agenda for the protection of children affected by armed con-
flict. It proposes that the experience of the international community 
may be critical in terms of concretizing and advancing further the IDP 
protection agenda.
My contribution examines Deng’s keystone concept of sovereignty 
as responsibility, arguing that positive dialogue and diplomacy must 
be reinforced by a structured regime of compliance, which would engen-
der and enforce international protection standards. This would entail 
the development of new institutional arrangements and infrastructure 
as a framework for adoption of concrete and targeted sanction mea-
sures against state and non-state parties to conflict for cases in which 
they systematically commit grave human rights violations.
The essay also contends that a critical liability inherent in Deng’s 
idea of sovereignty as responsibility is the primacy afforded to dia-
logue with national authorities, without adequate acknowledgment, 
consideration, or examination of the roles and responsibility of non-
state parties to conflict, which increasingly determine the lives of pop-
ulations falling under their spheres of power.
This article concludes that the effectiveness of Deng’s work, and 
ultimately his legacy on the IDP problem, will be viewed in the light of 
tangible protection for vulnerable populations, that is to say, whether 
we are able to enter an “era of application” of international protection 
standards.
II. Displacement
Large-scale internal displacement continues to be one of the princi-
pal characteristics of conflict in the post-Cold War era. As defined by 
the Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement, IDPs are “persons or 
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groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave 
their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or 
in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, 
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”1 
The assistance and protection of IDPs has been a preoccupation of the 
United Nations for a number of years. However, the international com-
munity has focused more strategically and concertedly on this prob-
lem in the past decade through the mandate of the Representative of 
the Secretary-General on IDPs and most recently in the framework of 
the Secretary-General’s Protection of Civilians agenda.
While the global refugee population has dropped by 20 percent over 
the past three years, the number of IDPs only declined by a modest 6 
percent in 2005,2 this in spite of the resolution of longstanding conflicts 
and significant return movements. Deng cites some 25 million people 
in more than 50 countries as having been uprooted from their homes 
and displaced within the boundaries of their countries as a conse-
quence of violence, grave human rights violations, or environmental 
disaster. In this global crisis, Africa is the most severely affected, with 
over half of the world’s IDPs. Perhaps the most dramatic case in point 
is Sudan, which currently represents the world’s worst crisis of internal 
displacement. In Sudan, 4.5 million people have been displaced by war 
in the south of the country and approximately 2 million in the region 
of Darfur.3
The year 2006 saw a significant increase in IDP numbers with waves 
of new displacements in many countries, including Sri Lanka, Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Sudan. Direct and system-
atic targeting of civilians, rapidly shifting conflicts, and restrictions on 
humanitarian access have led to repeated cycles of displacement, as 
witnessed for instance in Batticola district in Sri Lanka and in Darfur, 
as well as in Colombia, where protracted conflict over several decades 
has seen over six million people displaced, often several times, from 
their homes. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humani-
tarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that in at least twelve countries, six 
million internally displaced people receive no assistance or protection 
from their governments.
This snapshot of the global IDP crisis belies the concerted focus by 
the international community in the past several years and makes the 
most compelling case for my central argument: The present framework 
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of protection for IDPs has not yet extended far enough toward the 
application of international protection standards.
III. Elaboration of a Normative Framework for IDPs
The mandate of the Representative of the Secretary-General for IDPs 
has sought to address the global crisis of internal displacement by rais-
ing the level of public awareness, filling some of the critical knowledge 
gaps by fostering deeper analytical engagement on the problematique, 
and forging a stronger consensus at the political level. These efforts 
have been an important complement to the central project of develop-
ing a normative framework specifically for the assistance and protec-
tion of the internally displaced.
Deng initiated work on a normative framework on the basis of 
an analytical report that the United Nations Secretary-General pre-
sented in 1991, which concluded that there was “no clear statement 
of the human rights of internally displaced persons, or those at risk of 
becoming displaced.” Therefore, the Secretary-General recommended 
the elaboration of guidelines that would “[clarify] the implications of 
existing human rights law for persons who are internally displaced 
and [fashion] from existing standards one comprehensive, universally 
applicable body of principles which addressed the main needs and 
problems of such persons.”4 Deng suggests that the issue was in fact 
not the non-existence of international norms providing for the protec-
tion of IDPs, but rather that these norms were broadly dispersed in 
various instruments, and as such not accessible for effective advocacy 
in the assistance and protection of the internally displaced. At the same 
time, there were also gaps in the normative infrastructure that had to 
be addressed. Accordingly, the initial phase of work of Deng and col-
leagues consisted of convening a technical process to assess the norma-
tive terrain, to take stock of the existing standards for the protection of 
IDPs, and to propose areas for strengthening and where development 
of additional norms would be necessary.
Ensuring a broad-based “buy-in” for this technical process would 
be fundamental to the exercise. There was a need to build consen-
sus among multiple stakeholders, including United Nations agencies, 
funds, and programs; other prominent intergovernmental arrange-
ments, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross; aca-
demia; and NGOs, whose concerted advocacy and pressure over the 
preceding years had generated the necessary awareness leading to 
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greater prioritization and more serious treatment of the IDP problema-
tique by the international community. It was also critical to maintain 
the integrity of the exercise by ensuring that it remained “grounded.” 
In this regard, Deng’s deep and consistent engagement with local civil 
society in conflict-affected countries, as well as with the internally dis-
placed themselves, was crucial to the process.
As the technical exercise gained momentum, a simultaneous process 
of political consensus building among U.N. member states was also 
convened to secure their acceptance of the emerging normative frame-
work. Ultimately, the success of the IDP agenda constructed around 
the Guiding Principles would depend on the cooperation of govern-
ments and fostering a sense of ownership on their part. This becomes 
more readily apparent upon examination of Deng’s conceptual point of 
departure for the agenda, namely, the notion that the primary responsi-
bility for ensuring assistance and protection of the internally displaced 
resides with states as an aspect of their sovereignty.
Deng describes the Guiding Principles as follows:
The resulting Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement restate, inter-
pret and apply standards from the human rights, humanitarian and 
analogous refugee law. They are divided into four sections addressing 
the protection against displacement, protection and assistance during 
displacement, access to humanitarian assistance and return, resettle-
ment, and reintegration. The Guiding Principles apply not only to states, 
but also to ‘all other authorities, groups and persons in their relations 
with internally displaced persons.’ This includes non-state actors, inter-
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and internally dis-
placed persons themselves.
The added value, then, of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment is that they centralize the existing norms for assistance and pro-
tection of IDPs, and also contribute to closing gaps in the normative 
protection infrastructure for the internally displaced. Combined with 
stronger political consensus and more rigorous analytical treatment of 
the IDP issue, it is evident that the initiative has yielded some impor-
tant practical dividends, such as an improvement in the assistance 
response for IDPs. We have witnessed amelioration in the level of 
humanitarian support services for the internally displaced in the pro-
vision of basic life necessities, such as food, shelter, and clothing. The 
international community is expending more resources on assistance 
for IDPs than ever before, including through the newly established 
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Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), administered by OCHA. The 
CERF has been critical, especially in terms of more timely response to 
complex humanitarian emergencies.
However, Deng’s agenda for IDPs is not yet an adequate framework 
for improved protection response, especially in the face of purposive 
targeting of displaced populations for serious human rights violations, 
including killing and maiming, rape and other grave sexual violence, 
and overt denial of humanitarian access for IDPs. Also increasingly 
evident is that IDP camps have become prime recruiting grounds for 
child soldiers. Thus, the protection agenda under Deng’s mandate has 
not extended far enough, especially in terms of proposing and devel-
oping a structured regime for engendering compliance with interna-
tional protection standards or fostering institutional arrangements 
to this end. This dimension—a structured compliance regime—is a 
critical element for the redirection of emphasis from the elaboration of 
standards to their application on the ground. Ultimately, the effective-
ness of the agenda will be gauged by the ability of the international 
community to deliver adequate and timely humanitarian assistance to 
IDPs, but also in terms of tangible protection from systematic acts of 
violence and other human rights violations.
IV. Liabilities of “Sovereignty as Responsibility”5
As noted earlier, Deng’s conceptual point of departure in developing 
the IDP agenda has been to reinforce the notion of national sovereignty 
as a positive concept of the responsibility of states to protect their citi-
zens or individuals falling under their jurisdiction, particularly under 
circumstances of internal conflict. This translated into his conception 
of Sovereignty as Responsibility, articulated as follows:
State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibil-
ity for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insur-
gency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling 
or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-interference yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.6
Deng’s analytical starting point is an understanding of the changing 
order as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the global bi-
polar power arrangement that marked that period. As the prevailing 
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status quo disintegrated and American and Soviet support for their 
allies around the globe began to dissipate, the world witnessed the pro-
liferation of conflicts within states. Deng suggests that countries that 
had been able to suppress or manage conflict with the support of the 
superpowers were no longer able to do so effectively, or to deal with 
the serious humanitarian consequences of conflict. Intra-state conflict 
has resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of internally displaced. 
As the humanitarian situation around the world deteriorated with the 
end of the Cold War, Deng suggests that there was greater “pressure” 
on the notion that sovereignty may be invoked by states as “a barricade 
against international scrutiny.” Deng asserts that this shift in the global 
order has resulted in a new consciousness, namely, that “Human rights 
and humanitarian concerns [have begun] to replace strategic national 
interest as the driving norm in international politics.” Therefore, the 
end of the Cold War represented a critical turning point toward a new 
and more acute consciousness of human rights in general and the 
plight of the internally displaced in particular, leading to the genesis of 
the concerted international response to internal displacement.
The central emphasis of Deng’s advocacy has been on “diplomacy 
and the art of persuasion” as a means to compel national authorities to 
ensure assistance and protection of IDPs and to overcome humanitar-
ian access restrictions imposed by states in the name of sovereignty. He 
implies that states have a fundamental sense of responsibility towards 
their citizens, and as such there is always an inherent receptivity on the 
part of national authorities to cooperate with the international commu-
nity to address the plight of IDPs. This receptivity of states represents 
an entry point for dialogue on assistance and protection. The approach 
is also based in part on the assumption that for many governments, 
legitimization by the international community is a powerful incentive 
for good behavior, and dialogue on relief and protection of IDPs may 
be viewed as a vehicle to international legitimacy, or at least as valu-
able political capital. They may perceive the price of negative global 
public opinion or other international censure as a significant liability 
for their national interests. This also represents an entry point for dia-
logue and diplomacy.
To emphasize his point regarding the receptivity of states, Deng 
notes that in his extensive diplomatic engagements as an advocate for 
IDPs, “no government authority has ever argued, ‘I don’t care how 
irresponsible or irresponsive we are, this is an internal matter and none 
of your business.’ ” He argues that there exist “vacuums of responsibil-
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ity” in which IDPs fall as a consequence of governments distancing 
themselves from their obligations, but that this is often due to their lack 
of capacity to deal with overwhelming humanitarian crises. For Deng, 
these vacuums may be addressed through dialogue, diplomacy, and 
offers of assistance to governments by the international community, in 
order to enable national authorities to assume their responsibility.
It is evident that this approach provides critical relief to millions 
of IDPs around the world. However, specific cases also testify to the 
fact that there are indeed governments that are “irresponsible” or 
unresponsive, and situations in which grave human rights violations 
against IDPs are occurring through deliberate inaction, or with direct 
complicity, or even under explicit directions from national authorities. 
Such governments may often couch their dialogue with the interna-
tional community in “diplomatically/politically correct” human rights 
language, while at the same time purposefully pursuing domestic poli-
cies and practices that violate the most fundamental human rights 
tenets. For example, in their dialogue with the United Nations, some 
of the most notorious governments that recruit and use child soldiers 
stress the fact that they have ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Since this prohibits underage 
recruitment into the armed forces, it means that they therefore do not 
condone such activity. Yet in every practical sense they have not met 
this commitment, including the lack of commensurate reform by their 
national legislation to criminalize the practice of recruitment or to rig-
orously investigate and prosecute at the national level individuals in 
their armed forces who recruit children. They “look the other way” or 
are directly complicit because it suits what they view as their national 
interests.
Therefore, even though we are indeed entering an era of greater 
global consciousness and scrutiny on human rights issues, it overstates 
the case to suggest that human rights and humanitarian concerns are 
replacing strategic national interest as the driving norm of interna-
tional politics, as is argued by Deng. I would propose that states are 
as single-minded as ever about their national interests, but due to 
external pressures they have become more adept at making the right 
human rights noises to cover violations. That is to say, governments 
have developed an increasingly sophisticated human rights lexicon 
and rhetoric, and this, combined with invocations of sovereignty, has 
become a formidable barrier to meaningful international intervention 
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where cynical policies are being pursued against vulnerable groups 
including IDPs.
It is important to stress that the critical liability of Deng’s approach 
lies not in sovereignty as responsibility as a conceptual leitmotif, but 
rather in the lack of a strategic approach and framework (beyond 
advocacy and dissemination of norms, and assistance and protection 
dialogue) to translate this concept into tangible protection for the most 
vulnerable in situations of armed conflict. Diplomacy in the spirit of 
goodwill, responsibility, and constructive dialogue can only achieve 
positive results when concerned governments are also prepared to 
deal in this spirit. Where one is faced with irresponsible and unrespon-
sive interlocutors, diplomacy requires a different set of pressure tools 
and possibilities, essentially to be able to present a credible threat of 
sanctions against violating parties to compel them to take responsibil-
ity and alter behavior and practice.
Building a regime of compliance with international protection stan-
dards is precisely about generating the necessary political will. It means 
devising institutional arrangements and infrastructure to be able to 
adopt concrete and targeted measures against recalcitrant violators of 
human rights. In other words, the IDP protection agenda must have 
“teeth” in order to incentivize responsible behavior. In the absence 
of a compliance regime, the realities on the ground will continue to 
belie the high level of commitment of the international community 
as expressed in the extensive normative protection infrastructure that 
presently exists. The fact that Deng has not explored this dimension in 
his work represents a critical liability.
V. Considering Non-State Parties to Conflict
A second liability inherent in sovereignty as responsibility as a concep-
tual underpinning is that it privileges the state as the interlocutor in 
assistance and protection dialogue and diplomacy. Deng’s dispropor-
tionate emphasis on governments is conspicuous and unsustainable 
because in many intra-state conflicts today non-state parties, including 
rebel groups and other armed forces, are powerful determinants of 
the lives of people living under their effective control. Furthermore, 
these parties often commit the most heinous acts of violence against 
those civilian populations. For instance, in Sudan, a plethora of non-
state armed forces, including nomadic groups often referred to as 
Janjaweed, are committing grave human rights violations, including 
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systematic rape of girls around IDP camps in Darfur. The Revolution-
ary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone, infamous for acts of brutality 
including killing and maiming civilians and systematic recruitment 
of children, at certain points during ten years of conflict effectively 
controlled the entire country save for the capital, Freetown. The FARC 
rebels in Colombia are in control of a vast portion of that country, as 
are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and both groups commit human 
rights abuses against civilians in their territories of control. The Forces 
Nouvelle rebel group in Côte d’Ivoire controls the northern half of the 
country. The list goes on.
The issue of negotiations with non-state armed groups is an emerg-
ing discourse within the United Nations, and a vexing one at that. 
Some voices, particularly on the political side, carry reservations about 
treating with non-state armed groups because this may be perceived as 
tacit recognition and the conferral of legitimacy on parties that may be 
categorized as illegal or terrorist organizations. Others, particularly on 
the humanitarian side, insist that the assistance and protection impera-
tive should override other considerations and that the United Nations 
should seek to engage both state and non-state actors in protection dia-
logue. Realistically and practically, non-state parties must necessarily 
form part of the calculus of a viable assistance and protection agenda 
for IDPs.
VI. Issue of Leverage
The question becomes how to deal with actors who are not signatories 
to international protection treaties and conventions and as such do 
not carry sovereign responsibility in the same sense as a legitimate 
national authority. What incentives can be offered to non-state par-
ties? Or what disincentives can be put in place to prevent their abuses? 
I would suggest that in an emerging order increasingly defined by 
interconnectedness and globalization, the international community 
has unprecedented possibilities and opportunities to leverage non-
state parties.
The information revolution has made it increasingly difficult for 
those who commit grave violations to insulate themselves from scru-
tiny and the court of international public opinion and pressure. For 
many non-state groups who have political agendas and aspirations 
(and the vast majority of them do), the public image that they project 
is of vital importance. The Tamil Tigers, for instance, rely on extensive 
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diaspora networks in North America and Europe for advocacy and 
financial support to their cause. Their capacity to operate effectively 
depends on access to global financial institutions and mechanisms. 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, armed groups 
depend on global markets for illicitly exploited natural resources such 
as diamonds, timber, and coltan, in order to convert such resources into 
weapons and other “inputs” for conflict. They depend on satellite con-
nections and cellular networks to coordinate their military and public 
relations campaigns. The leaders and spokespeople of these groups 
often need to travel internationally to sustain their operations. All 
these aspects represent pressure points that may be targeted through a 
structured compliance regime.
Today, as never before, it is possible to raise the stakes and risk 
level for those who commit grave human rights violations because the 
means exist to institute targeted measures to sanction them. It is now 
largely a matter of generating the requisite political will within the 
international community for such action. There are encouraging indi-
cations that such will already exists.
VII. Compliance Regime for Children Affected by Armed Conflict7
In the past several years remarkable progress has been made in the 
structuring of a regime of monitoring, reporting, and compliance with 
international standards in the context of a contiguous agenda for the 
protection of children affected by armed conflict. This progress is sche-
matically outlined here as a basis for consideration in terms of the 
extension of the IDP protection agenda.
Strategically and tactically, the objective of the mandate of the Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict has been to locate this issue at the highest discussion table of 
the United Nations, by inscribing it on the peace and security agenda 
of the Organization. Within the ten-year existence of the mandate, the 
Security Council has adopted six resolutions focusing explicitly on 
the plight of war-affected children. This undertaking and the achieve-
ments that have been registered thus far are unprecedented. The ini-
tial resolution of the Security Council on children and armed conflict, 
Resolution 1261, adopted in 1999, represents the very first resolution of 
the Council on a thematic human rights issue. It opened the door for 
the engagement of the Security Council on a range of other thematic 
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concerns, including Women, Peace and Security and the Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict.
Each of the five subsequent resolutions of the Security Council 
on children and armed conflict since then—1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 
1460 (2002), 1539 (2004) and 1612 (2005)—have elaborated a frame-
work for the protection of children in situations of armed conflict, and 
have gradually focused on one specific aspect, namely, the systematic 
monitoring and reporting of particularly egregious violations against 
children as well as engendering compliance with international child 
protection standards to end impunity for these violations. It is impor-
tant to note that the project has focused on all parties to conflicts who 
commit violations, both state and non-state actors.
The latest resolution, Resolution 1612, effectively operationalizes 
the engagement of the Security Council by mandating the implemen-
tation of institutional arrangements and an infrastructure for compli-
ance. Resolution 1612 requests the Secretary-General to implement a 
mechanism to systematically monitor and report to the Council grave 
violations, including the annual preparation by the Secretary-General 
of a “naming and shaming” list of specific state and non-state parties 
to conflict who recruit and use child soldiers. The list also records 
five other grave violations: killing or maiming of children, rape or 
other sexual violence, abduction of children, attacks against schools 
or hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access for children. Resolu-
tion 1612 also establishes a dedicated Security Council Working Group 
on Children and Armed Conflict to continuously review information 
emanating from the monitoring mechanisms, and on the basis of this 
information recommend targeted measures that may be undertaken by 
the Security Council and other policy-level bodies against violators, as 
well as for programmatic response for war-affected children. Finally, 
the Resolution also requests that the parties to conflict engage in dia-
logue with the United Nations to prepare concrete and time-bound 
action plans to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers and to 
release to the United Nations and child protection NGOs all children 
associated with their forces in any capacity.
In effect, the Security Council has now put in place an infrastructure 
through which child protection actors are able to seize the attention of 
the Council on issues related to war-affected children on an “as needed 
basis,” as well as a referral arrangement for action against recalcitrant 
violators. The annual report of the Secretary-General serves as a gate-
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way and framework for the Security Council’s engagement on the issue 
and as a vehicle for the compliance regime that has been instituted.
A year after adoption of Resolution 1612, this institutional arrange-
ment and infrastructure has begun to yield tangible results in terms 
of protection for children. Parties to conflict perceive that the risk 
level for committing violations against children has risen appreciably 
because the Security Council has clearly demonstrated the political 
will to address impunity, and in a practical sense has organized itself 
to take concrete action. As a result, a number of parties to conflict 
have engaged the United Nations in dialogue for the preparation of 
child protection action plans, including the Forces Nouvelle as well as 
four pro-government militia groups in Côte d’Ivoire, who signed such 
plans in November 2005 and December 2006, respectively. This has 
resulted in the identification and release, so far, of some 1,400 children 
by the Forces Nouvelle.
The government of Uganda also committed to an action plan to 
end recruitment and use of children in their forces following a visit of 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict in July 2006. Other parties, such as the Tamil Tigers in 
Sri Lanka as well as parties to the conflict in Myanmar, have also sig-
naled their commitment to establish dialogue with the United Nations 
in the framework of Resolution 1612. Parties in Myanmar recently 
signed a formal Deed of Commitment on critical child protection con-
cerns.
In February 2006, the Security Council Sanctions Committee for Côte 
d’Ivoire established, pursuant to Resolution 1572 (2004), an approved 
list of individuals subject to specific sanctions, including a travel ban 
and attachment of financial assets. Commandant Martin Kouakou 
Fofie of Force Nouvelles was listed under the citation that forces under 
his command had engaged in recruitment of child soldiers, abduc-
tions, and sexual abuse and exploitation of children. Since then, the 
Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has 
recommended to the Council, amongst other specific conclusions, the 
referral to the existing Security Council Sanctions Committees of cases 
of continued grave violations against children by parties in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire.
The concerted engagement of the Security Council on the children 
and armed conflict protection agenda over the past ten years has con-
tributed significantly to a powerful momentum for an “era of applica-
tion” of international child protection standards and other concrete 
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actions by entities beyond the Security Council. For example, in March 
2006, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court issued 
a statement announcing the first indictment of the Court, of Thomas 
Lubanga, founder and leader of a militia group in Ithuri in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, for commission of war crimes: conscripting 
and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years, and using chil-
dren to participate actively in hostilities. In his statement, the Prosecu-
tor sounded a clear message of intent regarding impunity for crimes 
against children:
This is the first case, not the last. The investigation is ongoing, we will 
continue to investigate more crimes committed by Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo and we will also investigate other crimes committed by other 
groups. This is important, it’s a sequence. We will investigate crimes 
committed by other militias and other persons—this is the first case, not 
the last… . We are totally committed to staying in Congo—to make sure 
justice is done.8
Also in March 2006, Major Jean-Pierre Biyoyo became the first person 
to be convicted in a national judicial process for recruiting child sol-
diers. He was sentenced to five years imprisonment by a military tribu-
nal in the Democratic Republic of Congo.9
The former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was transferred into 
the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 17 March 2006, and 
indicted on eleven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
These included, “conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively 
in hostilities.”10 He is the first former Head of State to be held explicitly 
accountable for child recruitment.
The remarkable precedent that has been set on the children and 
armed conflict agenda represents a valuable “lessons-learned and best 
practices” experience, and carries distinct possibilities for moving into 
an era of the application of international standards in the context of the 
IDP agenda. Continued leadership, commitment, and vision is required 
to ensure that the international community makes good on the paper 
promises that have been made to protect vulnerable groups.
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VIII. Conclusion
The role of the United Nations as custodian and principal advocate for 
international norms and standards for the protection of the most vul-
nerable is one of the most critical responsibilities of the Organization. 
In the past decade, we have witnessed the elaboration of an unprece-
dented array of protection standards. As a result, today our normative 
infrastructure for protection is more extensive, coherent, and robust 
than ever before. However, in spite of the broad-based commitment to 
the principles enshrined in international protection standards, parties 
to conflict have increasingly demonstrated a willful disregard for the 
most basic tenets of international humanitarian law. For the United 
Nations to remain relevant into the future it must lead the redirection 
of the energies and emphasis of the international community from 
the elaboration of norms to their application on the ground. This will 
require the political will to develop new institutional arrangements 
and infrastructures for concrete and targeted measures against those 
who commit egregious human rights violations.
Under the leadership of Francis Deng, important progress has been 
made on the specific agenda for assistance and protection of the inter-
nally displaced. However, in order to more effectively deliver protec-
tion to this particular category of vulnerable people, the agenda must 
now enter a new territory in which a structured regime to ensure 
compliance with the applicable normative framework is elaborated. In 
the end, the work of Dr. Deng in this area will be viewed in the context 
of how effectively norms and strong political consensus are translated 
into tangible protection for vulnerable human beings.
Since 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General, together with the 
Security Council, has pushed the boundaries in terms of engendering 
compliance with protection standards in the context of his agenda for 
children affected by armed conflict. He has sought to position this 
critical issue centrally on the stage of international peace and security. 
The concerted and purposive engagement of the Security Council has 
now begun to translate into real improvements in the lives of children. 
Experience and inspiration may be drawn from this unprecedented 
advancement.
Specific examples of actions taken by different actors at the inter-
national level demonstrate that the necessary political will to address 
impunity for crimes against the most vulnerable groups can indeed 
be generated. The efforts of various actors, each in the scope of their 
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distinct mandates, roles, and jurisdictions, are gradually increasing the 
pressure on those who commit violations. It is clear that these parties 
“are sitting up and taking notice.” A distinct window of opportunity 
exists for the international community to press home the advantage. 
Advocacy for an era of application of international protection stan-
dards is no longer merely a utopian project.
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